República IX

— Eh bien soit, dis-je. Puisque nous en sommes arrivés à ce point b du dialogue, reprenons ce qui avait été dit au début, et qui nous a menés jusqu’ici. Il avait été dit, n’est-ce pas , qu’il était avantageux de commettre l’injustice, quand on était un homme parfaitement injuste mais qui avait la réputation d’être juste. N’est-ce pas ce qui avait été dit ?

— Si, c’est bien cela.

— Eh bien alors, dis-je, entrons en dialogue avec celui qui prétend cela, puisque nous sommes tombés d’accord sur la puissance respective de la pratique de l’injustice, et de celle de la justice.

— Est-ce qu’alors, dis-je, celui qui paraît être le plus méchant paraîtra aussi être c le plus malheureux ? Et celui qui aura exercé la tyrannie le plus longtemps et avec le plus d’intensité, aura-t-il été véritablement malheureux avec le plus d’intensité et le plus longtemps ? La masse, elle, a là-dessus une masse d’avis.

— Il est nécessaire de répondre oui, dit-il, en tout cas à ces questions.

571 — Celui qui reste dès lors à examiner, dis-je, c’est l’homme tyrannique lui-même : par quelle transformation il provient de l’homme démocratique ; une fois né, quel genre d’homme il est ; et quel genre de vie il mène, malheureuse ou bienheureuse

— Oui, en effet, c’est lui qui reste encore, dit-il.

— Or sais-tu, dis-je, ce dont je regrette encore le manque !

— Qu’est-ce ?

A descrição do ponto mais baixo a que chegou a degradação humana põe de novo a questão inicial da felicidade e virtude de cada uma destas espécies, em relação com as qualidades que predominam na cidade 1 , com a conclusão de que o tirano, escravo dos mais sórdidos prazeres e apetites, é o que mais se opõe ao filósofo-rei, que tem acesso aos prazeres puros e reais, e de que é a justiça, e não a injustiça, que traz vantagens a quem a pratica.

Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may revert to the words which brought us hither : Was not someone saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just ?

Yes, that was said. Now, then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a little conversation with him.

What shall we say to him ?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Of what sort ?

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable ? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable ; although this may not be the opinion of men in general ?

Yes, he said, inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State ; and the same of the others ?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man ?

To be sure.

Last of all comes the tyrannical man ; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical ? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery ?

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.

What question ? I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the inquiry will always be confused.

Well, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.

• 5 A tirania

  • O excesso de liberdade e desprezo das leis fazem passar da democracia à tirania

    • passa-se de um extremo (a liberalidade) ao outro (a servidão)

    O povo escolhe para defendê-lo dos ricos um homem a que concede todos os poderes e uma guarda pessoal

    O tirano cresce este exército e a redireciona contra o povo

    O homem tirânico é dominado pelo desejos desregrados (aqueles que se manifestam no sono, a loucura ou sob o império da bebida)