é um diálogo platônico que ocupa-se com o conceito de lei.

Jowett: Minos 318e-321d — A verdade sobre Minos

Socrates : I will tell you, in order that you may not share the impiety of the multitude : for there cannot conceivably be anything more impious or more to be guarded against than being mistaken in word and deed with regard to the gods, and after them, with regard to divine men ; you must take very great precaution, whenever you are about to [319a] blame or praise a man, so as not to speak incorrectly.

Jowett: Minos 314b-318e — Segunda tentatica de definição de lei. Objeções e respostas.

Socrates : Then what thing especially of this sort shall we surmise law to be ?

Companion : Our resolutions and decrees, I imagine : for how else can one describe law ? [314c] So that apparently the whole thing, law, as you put it in your question, is a city’s resolution.

Socrates : State opinion, it seems, is what you call law.

Companion : I do.

Socrates : And perhaps you are right : but I fancy we shall get a better knowledge in this way. You call some men wise ?

Companion : I do.

Socrates : And the wise are wise by wisdom ?

Jowett: Minos 313b-314b — Primeira tentatica de definição de lei

Companion : Well, what else should law be, Socrates, but things loyally accepted ?

Socrates : And so speech, you think, is the things that are spoken, or sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard ? Or is speech [313c] something distinct from the things spoken, sight something distinct from the things seen, and hearing something distinct from the things heard ; and so law is something distinct from things loyally accepted ? Is this so, or what is your view ?

Companion : I find it now to be something distinct.