dianoia

gr. : razão discursiva, pensamento discursivo.

Taylor: Ciência

SCIENCE. This word is sometimes defined by Plato to be that which assigns the causes of things; sometimes to be that the subjects of which have a perfectly stable essence; and together with this, he conjoins the assignation of cause from reasoning. Sometimes again he defines it to be that the principles of which are not hypotheses; and, according to this definition, he asserts that there is one science which ascends as far as to the principle of things.

Conceitos (ennoiai, prolepsis, logoi)

Em Plotino o apelo a conceitos é ainda limitado. Ele fala da necessidade de empregar conceitos já disponíveis no intelecto para reconhecer instâncias de beleza (Eneada-I, 6, 3) ou bondade (Eneada-V, 3, 3) ou fogo (Eneada-VI, 7, 6). Ele também diz que a razão discursiva usa formas (eide) que tem em si mesmo, para passar julgamento (epikrisis) em imagens providas pela percepção dos sentidos (Eneada-I, 1, 9).

Igal: Tratado 2,8 (IV, 7, 8) — Se a alma fosse um corpo não teria pensar

8. Porque no es posible pensar, si el alma es realmente un cuerpo, de qué clase de cuerpo podría tratarse. Veamos para ello: si la sensación consiste en el uso del cuerpo por parte del alma para la percepción de las cosas sensibles, el pensamiento entonces, no consiste en percibir por medio del cuerpo, ya que en ese caso sería la misma cosa que la sensación. Si pensar consiste en percibir sin el cuerpo, conviene con mayor razón que el ser que piensa no sea un cuerpo. Porque, en fin de cuentas, la sensación se refiere a las cosas sensibles y el pensamiento a las cosas inteligibles.

Guthrie: Tractate 27 (IV, 3, 29) - MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION

MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION.

29. Can memory be referred to sensibility? Is the I faculty that feels also the one that remembers? But if the image of the soul (the irrational soul) possess the memory, as we said above, there would be in us two faculties that will feel. Further, if sensibility be capable of grasping notions, it will also have to perceive the conceptions of discursive reason, or it will be another faculty that will perceive both.

MEMORY DOES NOT BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE POWER OF PERCEPTION.